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Numbing the Heart: Racist Jokes 
and the Aesthetic Affect
  Tanya Rodriguez 
Abstract
People sometimes resist the idea that racist humor fails on
aesthetic grounds because they find it funny.  They make the
case that we can enjoy its comic aspects by controlling our
attention, by focusing on a joke’s rhythm or delivery rather
than on its racist content.  Ironic intent may reside with the
joke teller and/or the audience.  I discuss how arguments for
the immorality of racist jokes fall short.  Ironic racist jokes
may be acceptable to an audience that already rejects racism
but is comfortable with such ironic racist joking precisely
because as individuals they feel confident in their own rejection
of genuine racism.  Distinguishing between straightforward
racist humor and ironically framed racist humor reveals a price
that must be paid.  The controlled attention demanded, or
even extorted,  by ironic racist humor is possible only by
forsaking empathy as the listener divorces himself from the
feelings of those affected and thereby becomes a complicit if
impartial spectator.  Thus, if I say that a joke is not good
because it is racist, it does not necessarily follow that the joke
is not funny.  What does result, however, is that appreciating
such humor entails a lack of empathy for it insists upon
numbing the heart.
Key Words
aesthetic affect, empathy, humor, ironic joking, jokes, race,
racial aesthetics, racism
It is enough for us to stop our ears to the sound
of music in a room where dancing is going on, for
the dancers at once to appear ridiculous.  How
many human actions would stand a similar test? 
Should we not see many of them suddenly pass
from grave to gay on isolating them from the
accompanying music of sentiment?  To produce
the whole of its effect, then, the comic demands
something like a momentary anesthesia of the
heart.
—Henri Bergson[1]
1. Introduction
Empathy has been widely discussed in aesthetics, especially as
one of the essential values of literature and of the arts in
general. When we empathize with a character, we take on that
character’s feelings: we are shocked with her and we hurt
when she hurts.  This often occurs when reading fiction or
poetry or when watching a film, play, ballet, or opera.  Usually
we empathize because we identify with and admire a
character, but sometimes a character with whom we identify in
a work of art we would despise in real life.  Both kinds of
experience inspire compassion and, perhaps, develop our
moral capacities. 
I think empathy is an important topic for at least two reasons.
 Understanding it, including its theoretical perspectives, may
enrich our experiences of art works.  More important, the
mechanisms of aesthetic empathy are vitally relevant to social
life.  I believe that if the way in which we relate to fictional
characters affects our relationships with real people, the
ethical implications are obvious.  I do not pretend to prove
such a hypothesis.  Instead, I examine the role that empathy
or the lack of it, plays in aesthetic uptake.  I argue that
successful uptake sometimes requires a distance that
diminishes not only the aesthetic experience in the moment
but our empathic capacity as well.  My hypothesis is that racist
jokes, ironic or not, put their audience in a position at odds
with the compassion that characterizes empathy. 
Although my focus here is on race, it is possible that other
deeply offensive types of humor cwould fit my argument just
as well.  I focus on race because racist jokes are what I have
personally encountered most often.  In a straightforward racist
joke, the fictional characters are immoral and the audience
must adopt the position of the racist character to get the
joke.  Through identification with this imaginary character we
distance ourselves from the fictional subject of the joke.  In so
doing, I believe we also distance ourselves from real,
nonfictional persons included in the joke’s racism. Racist jokes
told ironically suffer from the same problem.  The ironic racist
joke is supposed to be a joke on or at the expense of a racist
character, and by implication, on real-life racists too, yet its
effect is often the same: its racist implications survive the
irony, and to enjoy the humor the audience members must
harden their hearts.  Aesthetic appreciation thus places the
audience in an immoral position.  Since a joke is merely a joke
its appreciation seems to suggest that ethical considerations
are irrelevant.  Instead of enlightening us, racist jokes do the
opposite.  Cold-hearted laughter is not only ugly; it is
deadening.  Such laughter results from an ugliness that has
both aesthetic and ethical implications.
A philosopher at a recent conference of the American Society
for Aesthetics conference  commented, “I wouldn’t want to live
in a world with no offensive jokes.”  Ted Cohen makes a
comparable observation in his book, Jokes: Philosophical
Thoughts on Joking Matters: “I have come to realize that if
there is a problem with such [offensive] jokes, the problem is
compounded exactly by the fact that they are funny.  Face
that fact.”[2]  These statements reveal mistrust in moral
condemnation of the arts.  They suggest that as long as a joke
is funny, its morality may be suspended. They also seem to
suggest that being offended may be good for us,  a point with
which I agree.  I think these comments allude to  humor as
one of our most guarded and prized values.  We might give up
a lot of laughter if we eliminated offensive jokes.
2. Beauty v. goodness
Theoretically speaking, empathy lies at the intersection of
ethics and aesthetics.  In ethics, empathy serves to integrate
emotion with an ethics of care; in the aesthetic realm,
empathy strengthens the emotional connection between art
work and audience.  A strong philosophical tradition links
aesthetics and ethics through the emotions.  Plato made a
moral attack on poetry for indulging the emotions and
encouraging irrationality.  He wanted it banned from his
republic [607a].  In the Ion, Plato describes the orator of
poetry as out of his mind and scolds audiences for their
approval of fictional characters they would despise in life
[534e].  On the other hand, Aristotle’s analysis of tragedy
praises catharsis as a means of aesthetic and moral
development through emotion.  If we do not feel along with
the characters, we are not affected by the work, and its value
for teaching virtue is diminished.  For David Hume, sympathy
explains the transmission of emotion among persons as well
as our shared reactions to works of art.  Tolstoy saw art as a
channel of human communication and emotional union.[3]
Berys Gaut, Marcia Eaton, and Noël Carroll, among others,
argue for a conceptual connection between aesthetics and
ethics.  Gaut argues for ethicism, contending that some ethical
concerns have aesthetic relevance when ethical attitudes or
values are prescribed by a work.[4]  Aes-ethical judgments,
Marcia Eaton’s idiosyncratic coinage, are those judgments of
merit that are at once ethical and aesthetic.   She cites the
example of purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria).  When one
learns about the widespread damage done to native
ecosystems by this flowering weed, she argues, a judgment of
beauty becomes inappropriate.[5]  Noël Carroll’s moderate
moralism holds that a moral flaw can, at times, also be an
aesthetic flaw and that for certain genres, moral comment is
as appropriate as formal comment.  Carroll argues that
many of the emotions that the audience brings to
bear, as a condition of narrative intelligibility, are
moral both in the sense that many emotions, like
[justified] anger  . . . possess ineliminable moral
components, and in the sense that many of the
emotions that are pertinent to narratives are
frequently moral emotions, such as the
indignation that pervades a reading of Uncle
Tom’s Cabin.[6]
Narrative art works specifically require audiences to rely upon
antecedent moral judgments and moral emotions to engage
and make sense of the story.  My goal here is to show that
jokes belong to this kind of narrative since, to “get” a joke,
audiences must fill in the narrative by drawing upon morally
suspect inferences.
Moral emotion is not universally accepted as relevant to
judgments of art.  Autonomists separate aesthetic and moral
judgment, insisting on maintaining a distinction between
goodness and beauty.  Whether or not a work of art inspires,
exemplifies, or adheres to tenets of goodness are all questions
of morality, not of artistic value.  In this view, beautiful and
profound art works may be the result of cruelty, depict
abhorrent acts, and even inspire evil behavior.  However, as
Gaut writes, “The live debate is between those who maintain
that ethical properties are never aesthetically relevant and
those who maintain that they sometimes are.”[7]  I do not
argue that the immoral consequences of an art work constitute
an aesthetic defect, or claim that racist jokes are flawed
simply because they may propagate stereotypes. Eaton
incorporates context and consequence, which makes sense for
judgments of natural beauty in which aesthetic intention is not
at stake.
My critique of racist joking lies closer to Aristotle’s observation
that, if comedy is too ugly, it loses its humor.  In comedy, he
writes, the artist creates distance between life and art by
representing men as worse than they really are.  Yet comedy
“consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or
destructive.”[8]  If a joke is too mean-spirited or if the pain
suffered by the subject of the joke is too great, then the
intended comedic effect is not achieved.  This shortcoming is
the fault of the comic whose mimesis fails to create the
aesthetic distance between life and art necessary for aesthetic
appreciation (which Aristotle also views as especially critical to
the paradoxical pleasure of tragedy).  Perhaps racist humor is
too painful because the mimesis is in some sense as bad as, or
worse than, the reality the joke represents.
While we certainly can separate overlapping strands of ethical
judgment about art, I am not convinced that we must.  Doing
so is useful, however, to the extent that it clarifies certain
scenarios.  In particular, what I call the paradox of offensive
humor benefits from such analysis.  It is useful to distinguish
three variants of racist joking: the straightforward, the self-
protectively ironic, and the ironic.  In racist joking intended to
mean what it seems to mean, the aesthetic flaw is typically a
lack of originality.  Self-protective irony dissimulates genuine
feeling rather than communicating it through a subtext.  It is
aesthetically flawed because it hides the aesthetic intention:
the joker merely pretends to be ironic and uses irony as a
cover.  In contrast, the truly ironic racist joke capitalizes on
the lack of originality in racist jokes and exploits it.  Racist
joking that is clearly ironic does not necessarily exhibit either
flaw; it may be original and communicate clearly.  What then,
if anything, is aesthetically wrong with ironic racist jokes?
When individuals utilize the comment “It’s just a joke” as a
defense, they are implying that responses to jokes are and
should be free from real-world concerns, just as autonomists
do when they restrict evaluation of art to narrow categories of
aesthetic relevance.  For them, in a racist joke, real-world
oppression is not a relevant or even appropriate factor in
appreciation.  Ted Cohen writes:  “Wish that there were no
mean jokes.  Try remaking the world so that such jokes will
have no place, will not arise.  But do not deny that they are
funny.  That denial is a pretense that will help nothing.”[9]
Cohen thus sets humor apart from the moral:  to describe a
joke as “mean” is an inappropriate aesthetic response.  He
insists that we recognize the humor in certain mean or racist
jokes and therefore engage in an autonomist approach.  He
wants credit for the humor without the blame based on moral
objections or meanness.  While he recognizes that some jokes
are objectionable, he sees a problem in identifying their moral
defect:  “First is the problem of finding a basis for any moral
judgment passed upon fiction, and then there is the problem
of establishing the impropriety of laughing at something
especially when the something is fictional.”[10]
Most of us will agree that certain jokes should not be told in
front of or by certain people or on certain occasions. 
Nevertheless, some resist the notion that it is wrong to tell a
given joke in the absence of such limiting situations. What is
the harm in two close friends, both opponents of real
oppression, exchanging a joke that theoretically might hurt
certain people when there is no chance that they will hear it? 
The humor of such a case is based on the uptake required of
the hearer, on the intimacy established by the joke between
teller and hearer, and perhaps on the pleasure of relief in
laughing at something unpleasant.  None of these responses
seems wrong. Our ability to detach from the joke and the
joke’s larger context allows our enjoyment of a potentially
offensive joke and is characteristic of the autonomist’s
position.  Particularly in the case of fiction, an aesthetic
response is coupled with the knowledge that we have some
control in our real lives.  Some argue that it is the knowledge
that tragedy is not real life that enables us to appreciate it.  If,
like Cohen, we think of jokes as short stories, there is no point
in practical ethical objections to racist jokes, since we can
have no influence over a fictional joke world.
Berys Gaut criticizes such arguments against ethical
assessment in a way relevant to racist jokes:  “The step from
the claim that the will is disengaged and therefore that ethical
assessment has no role to play does not follow: there is
similarly no possibility of altering historical events, and we are
in this sense forced to have a detached or contemplative
attitude toward them, but we still ethically assess historical
characters and actions.”[11]  We engage ethically with history
and we can engage with fiction in the same way.  The
difference, to borrow from Aristotle, is that “one relates what
has happened, the other what may happen.”[12]
The comparison between appropriate ethical responses to
history and to fiction is telling.  Surely it would be reasonable,
for example, to admonish a writer for misrepresenting slavery
as an acceptable practice even if we could not show that the
misrepresentation had any practical consequences.  We could
appeal to the moral superiority of truthfulness: slavery existed
and exists in the real world and lying about it harms those
being misinformed, through lies, especially because we hope
that understanding historical events and their moral
importance will enlighten our current practices and even our
feelings about those practices. Consider Margaret Mitchell’s
Gone with the Wind, a popular novel that dramatizes the
antebellum South. We might criticize the novel for its
sentimentality and its tendentious misrepresentation of the
story’s historical background.  Such an accusation of moral
failure relies upon a distinction between truth and falseness
even in fiction, even if it is difficult to establish actual
detrimental effects of a novel on society.  Of course it would
not make sense to condemn any fiction outright for a simple
lack of truth value; by that criterion, almost all novels would
appear de facto immoral.  Yet we may demand responsibility to
historical truthfulness beyond the details of fictional character
and story.  Similarly, even without proof that a morally
objectionable joke has negative real-world consequences, our
engagement with it subjects us to ethical scrutiny.
In an argument that departs from the passages quoted above
from his book on jokes, Cohen clearly explains the
unacceptability of some jokes to some people:
Suppose that prejudice against P’s is a bad thing,
and that to be amused by an x-joke requires a
disposition which is related to anti-P prejudice,
although that disposition is not itself a prejudice. 
The joke will be accessible only to those who
either have the disposition or can, in imagination,
respond as if they had it.  The joke is obviously
conditional—it is affective; but it will also be
fundamentally parochial (essentially conditional,
one might say) if there are people who cannot
find it accessible.  What people will be in this
position?  P’s I think.  Even the imagined
possession of the disposition is in conflict with
what makes these people P’s.  To appreciate the
joke a P must disfigure himself.  He must forsake
himself.  He should not do that.  In fact, he
cannot do that while remaining a P.  The rest of
us, who are not P’s, should not appreciate the
joke although we can in a sense in which a P
cannot.  The joke is exclusionary and should be
resisted.[13]
For Cohen, laughing at a racist or sexist joke does not require
that I actually hold racist/sexist views, only that I imagine
holding them.  Who cannot imagine holding such views?  P’s. 
Cohen recognizes that I cannot find a joke funny if in so doing
I must forsake an essential part of who I am—my gender,
race, or sexuality. “Her reply could be that she cannot bring
her sense of humor to that joke without imaginatively taking
on a disposition at odds with her conception of herself as a
woman or a certain kind of woman.  And if she is essentially a
woman or a certain kind of woman, then she cannot reach that
joke without a hideous cost.”[14]
I argue that there are others who could not appreciate the
joke even if they need not forsake some essential part of
themselves to do so.  If an audience can find the humor but
should not, then the joke fails on moral grounds.  An imagined
possession of anti-P prejudice is also in conflict with empathy
for P’s.  When the audience cannot find the humor because the
joke is so parochial as to be sectarian, the joke fails on
aesthetic grounds.
Even though Cohen offers grounds for resisting exclusionary
jokes, he retreats from this position in a more recent book: “I
insist that you not let your conviction that a joke is in bad
taste, or downright immoral, blind you to whether you find it
funny.”[15]  Contradicting his earlier condemnation of
offensive jokes, he writes:  “[M]y complaint that such jokes
are in bad taste or unwholesome comes to nothing more than
my wish to be made free of them.”[16]  He asserts that if it
were true that such jokes are symptoms of or cause pernicious
beliefs, they would warrant a moral objection, yet he
concludes that no one can know or show they are or do. 
Contemporary moral theories would require proof that a joke
produces genuine harm or that it reduces the moral character
of those trafficking in them.  Since no moral theory can be
invoked, he argues, we cannot condemn the joke.  What
Cohen once described as a “hideous cost” he now considers a
matter of personal taste, a failure on the part of the audience. 
Although Cohen maintains that the only person in this role is
the person about whom the joke is made, I contend that this
position is equally tenable by empathetic listeners whose
racial, gender, cultural  or other personal identity is not under
attack, but who empathize with the person whose self-
conception is at odds with the joke to such a degree that they
find no humor in the joke.
3. Empathy and identification
Distinctions among aesthetic identification, sympathy, and
empathy are useful in understanding what I see as the
problem in ironic racist jokes.  To the extent that it is possible,
I want to avoid a detailed consideration of identification in the
nonaesthetic sense.  Racial, gender, and sexual identity are
complex topics I could not adequately treat within the scope of
this essay.  By the term nonaesthetic identification, I intend
here to refer straightforwardly to a person’s concept of what is
essential to the self.  Of course, identity is socially constructed
at least insofar as culture acknowledges and instructs our
ability to self-identify.  I cannot arbitrarily choose to identify
as an African-American male if I am a Latina woman, but the
extent to which being a Latina affects my self-image and
projection of self is to some degree within my control.
Aesthetic identification, on the other hand, is imaginative.  It
puts us in the position of the other, seeing through that
individual’s eyes.  We are likely to identify with Humbert
Humbert in Lolita, for example, however uncomfortable that
may make us because, as a first-person narrator, he controls
our knowledge of the title character.
Identification with a character or point of view may or may not
induce sympathy or empathy. I characterize the distinction
between sympathy and empathy as the difference between
feeling for and feeling as.  I feel for Lolita, although Humbert
gives me too little information to really imagine being in her
position.  Empathic identification, which allows us to feel what
a character feels, is the strongest form of emotional
engagement. We may or may not feel sympathy for the
character as well.  If we feel Anna Karenina’s despair but think
that she deserves her fate, we could describe our aesthetic
identification as empathic but not sympathetic.
Suppose that racist jokes do not necessarily “propagate
stereotypes” since, as Cohen points out, such a universal claim
is difficult to establish.  At least two problems other than
stereotyping deserve attention.  When a racist joke about
someone of my race is told in my presence, there are two
ways I might interpret it.  On the one hand, the joke cheats
me of my individuality, anonymously grouping me with all
people of a type.  On the other hand, when a person tells a
racist joke intending to exclude me, they disrespect my
cultural identity.  Consider this recent real-life situation: a
group of my colleagues was discussing the existence of a
philosophy list-serve, called ‘Hisp-list,’ for Latin American
philosophers, and one of my colleagues remarked, “They
should call it ‘Spic-list.’”  A round of laughter followed.  If the
joke teller didn’t intend to mock me—aiming at Latino
philosophers in general, not me personally—the exclusion was
in bad faith because everyone there knew that I am a Latina
philosopher.  There was no reason to exclude me from the
mocked group except that I was present.  Moreover, I do not
want to be excluded from a group with which I identify. While
it is easy to grow weary of discussions about race in American
society, and some would like to discard race as a subject
altogether, we as philosophers must recognize that analysis of
race is necessary so long as people identify and are identified
by race and culture.
4. Identification and audience uptake
Ironic racist jokes, those jokes allegedly made at a racist
character’s expense, and by implication, at the expense of real
racists too, share features with straightforwardly racist jokes
that qualify them for the same critique.  Often, when someone
tells a joke intended ironically, some listeners feel
uncomfortable even when they recognize the ironic intent.  The
listener is asked to identify with the racist to make the
inferences needed to understand the joke.  If the listener does
not in fact sympathize with racist sentiments, she is trapped in
a perturbing contradiction.  Moreover, racist jokes can be
disturbing if we are not certain they are intended in an entirely
ironic way—in other words, if the joke teller is deploying an
element of self-protective irony.  While the ironic joker claims
an intention to mock racism, if the joke’s message survives
the irony, then either the irony has failed or it was never
intended to reverse the racist message.
Immorality in art works, as David Pole argues, creates an
internal incoherence:  when a work of art presents an immoral
view, it will be jarring, causing a distortion that detracts from
the aesthetic impact.  However, an immoral view will not
distort a work that is immoral as a whole.[17] Furthermore, in
the case of jokes, a nonsensical narrative twist does not
necessarily constitute an aesthetic flaw.  While internal
incoherence detracts from many forms of art, jokes often
depend upon it.  Consider this, from the anthology Truly
Tasteless Jokes:
Why didn’t the black man want to marry a
Mexican?
—He didn’t want the kids to grow up too lazy to
steal.[18]
The humor here depends incoherently upon racist stereotypes
of blacks and Mexicans as, respectively, criminal and lazy, and
upon the counterfactual notion that learned behavior is
inherited. With jokes we are ensnared by more problems than
arise with the ordinary fictions Pole takes into account.  In
seeking a basis for ethical criticism that is aesthetically
relevant to humor, a critique of mere internal incoherence is
inadequate. The formal structure depends on the twisted logic,
as is often the case with humor.
As an alternative, Gaut proposes the “merited response”
argument.  When a work prescribes an unmerited aesthetic
response, it is aesthetically flawed.  If a tragic love story is
more comical than poignant, for example, it is flawed because
it has not earned the kind of response it intends. Genre
markers are an obvious way that works prescribe a particular
audience uptake.  Consider Gaut’s merited response argument
applied to racist jokes.  Jokes by definition prescribe humor
and stereotyping by definition is unimaginative.  Thus, even if
a racist joke successfully manipulates its audience to laugh,
the quality of their amusement is subject to criticism.  Gaut
writes:  “The aesthetic relevance of prescribed responses wins
further support from noting that much of the value of art
derives from its deployment of an affective mode of cognition
—derives from the way works teach us, not by giving us
merely intellectual knowledge but by bringing that knowledge
home to us.”[19]
Ironic racist jokes introduce another level of difficulty.  Racism
is generally unimaginative and racist jokes are correspondingly
dull, qualities resulting from the nature of racism itself.  It
would then seem to follow that racism would constitute an
aesthetic flaw.  In ironic racism, as I interpret Gaut, the joke
prescribes laughter but also unease with the cause of that
laughter.The resulting revelatory humor reveals some
uncomfortable truth about the world that is usually hidden or
ignored.  If the revelation is obvious, unenlightening, or
unconvincing, the prescribed unease is unmerited and the
laughter inappropriate.  I believe that such revelation falls flat
precisely when the teller lacks empathy with both the subject
and the audience.  Revelatory humor depends upon the need
for revelation.  Jokes about race often fall flat if the audience
is already aware of their irrationality and has suffered from it. 
An audience that feels empathy for such suffering will also
make revelatory humor inappropriate and laughter
unwarranted.
When does revelatory humor succeed?  Ted Cohen directs his
attention to devices for achieving intimacy.  A Polish or Irish
joke in which it really matters that the character is Polish or
Irish demands more of the hearer, involves him more
intimately, and gives him a greater opportunity for self-
congratulation in his appreciation of the joke.  In Cohen’s
view, then, the devices a joke employs to achieve intimacy
with its audience are relevant to its appreciation.  However,
self-protective irony precludes intimacy.  Thus it follows that
the role of self-protective irony in joking must also be relevant
to its appreciation.
Consider the following offensive joke:
How do you keep blacks out of your backyard?
—Hang one in your front yard.[20]
Cohen would categorize a joke like this as conditional because
it requires background knowledge in its audience and affective
because the background required is a certain prejudice or
feeling.  Consider a listener without the necessary
background:  How would she have access to the joke without
concerted effort?
If I analyze the stages of my own response upon hearing this
joke, I realize that I first considered the teller:  He likely
comes from a mostly segregated community.   I then recalled
hearing an old man on television worrying about undesirables
moving into that community’s “backyard.”  I grasped the
literal and figurative meaning of backyard.  I considered the
vile American history of lynching black people, the joke’s
sinister subtext.  Finally, I also smelled the stench of a certain
nostalgia that anticipates a particular inclination: To get this
joke, the listener must recall the early twentieth century, and
a predominantly rural America in which most people had back
and front yards and lynching was an essential part of the
regime of terror that maintained Jim Crow.  A joke like this
told to an audience without the requisite background requires
too much effort for the uptake of humor than a more
straightforward racist joke requires.  Apparently, then, it must
have been told ironically, since the audience was diverse and
lacking the affective disposition I have described.  However,
the revelatory success of irony also requires conditions not
met by this audience.  Telling the joke, then, falls into the
category of self-protective irony because it demands
inferences that convey the straightforward message without
intending second-order revelation.
5. Getting it:  empathy and affect
If I am the subject of the joke or empathic with its victims,
there are certain conditions under which I will not find it
funny, conditions that set up a tension between my self-
respect and my ability to step outside myself and assume an
external viewpoint.  When the joke demeans some valued
aspect of my identity, aesthetic appreciation requires
objectivity beyond the joke’s worth; to laugh requires that I
rank humor above my own subjective experience.  A joke that
belittles women would require me as a woman to demean
myself.  It is one thing to laugh at oneself; we humans are
funny animals.  Yet a contradiction in values arises when I
must unidentify with a hard-won and perhaps still threatened
self-conception or belief.
I explain Cohen’s original explanation for some people’s
inability to laugh at certain jokes because of a predisposition
that interferes with a particular aesthetic value thus:
1.    The joke in question demeans X, and I am 
       X.
2.    Either laughter is more valuable or X’s 
       self-respect is more valuable.
3.    Thus aesthetic appreciation in the form of 
       laughter implies negation of the value of 
       self-respect.
Conclusion:  Self-respect prohibits laughter and
appreciation of X-demeaning jokes.
However, Cohen holds that a personal reaction alone does not
establish a joke’s immorality:  “This does not mean that it is
unreal, that you should persist in telling me such jokes on the
grounds that is only a personal, subjective matter that they do
not agree with me, but it would mean that my complaint that
such jokes are in bad taste or unwholesome comes to nothing
more than my wish to be free of them.”[21] I cannot condemn
the joke in itself; I may merely assert my wish to be free of it.
What if I am predisposed to be offended by a given joke by
virtue not of my identity but my empathetic imagination? 
Consider the following paradigm:
1.    The joke in question demeans X, and I put 
       myself in X’s shoes (I imagine being X, 
       specifically, what it feels like to be X in this 
       situation).
2.    Either laughter is more valuable or X’s 
       self-respect is more valuable.
3.    Thus, aesthetic appreciation in the form 
       of laughter implies negation of the value 
       of imagined self-respect.
4.    Self-respect prohibits laughter at X’s.
Conclusion:  Empathy for X prohibits laughter at
and appreciation of X-demeaning jokes.
I believe that empathy, not sympathy, makes the humor in
such cases inaccessible.  Being sympathetic to X, I would
disapprove of and discourage such jokes, but my sympathy
would not necessarily interfere with aesthetic appreciation.  If
I am kindwhen I hear a well-constructed racist joke, I might
laugh and then disapprove, precisely the paradoxical response
of the listener who does not like the joke but insists that
ethical objections do not prevent his finding the joke funny. 
Nonetheless, ironic racist joking depends on an absence of
feeling that compromises the listener’s humanity, and this
constitutes an aesthetic as well as an ethical flaw.
When people laugh at racist jokes, even those told ironically,
they often feel uncomfortable.  Why should someone who finds
a joke immoral laugh?  I believe a suspension of identification
allows the listener to follow the joke’s logic while an
awareness of the assumptions necessary to get the joke
provokes guilty feelings.  Identifying with the racist point of
view enables the assumptions; shifting away from that point
of view entails the guilt.  Moreover, perhaps catching the
implications too easily makes the listener feel self-conscious
about making racist inferences.
Ironic racist jokes are jokes at racists’ expense.  Here is my
favorite example, a philosopher’s joke about racist jokes, a
meta-joke:
How many X’s does it take to screw in a light
bulb?
—A whole lot, because they are so dirty and
stupid.[22]
Here X is not a variable but a constant that signals the
variability and thus the irrelevance of ethnicity in this class of
jokes.  The irony succeeds in part because the joke offends no
particular group.  The ulterior message demonstrates the
absurdity and bad faith of the surface message in ordinary
jokes of this form.  The irony here is entirely distinct from self-
protective irony, through which the speaker invests feeling in
the joke’s overt message but seeks to disguise that feeling
with apparent irony.  This is also a good example of revelatory
humor, because it shifts the focus of the behind the scene
facts of so many offensive jokes:  they are meaningless except
to express hatred.  
I am interested here primarily in neither this rare kind of
meta-joke nor in self-protective racist irony, but in ironically
framed and delivered racist jokes as I defined them above.  I
do not argue that ironic racist jokes numb the heart differently
from nonironic ones.  Rather, I seek to fill the gap where
arguments for the immorality of racist jokes fall short.  Ironic
racist jokes are acceptable to an audience that already rejects
racism but feels comfortable with ironic racist joking precisely
because its members feel confident in their own rejection of
genuine racism.
I have argued that empathy with marginalized people
interferes with finding humor in at least some racist jokes,
ironic or otherwise.  Yet I question how certain individuals who
are not racist nonetheless at times find racist jokes humorous?
  I argue that this reaction results not from their inherent
immorality but because they lack empathy specifically for
those who are the object of the joke.  Their laughter reflects
denial of the real nature of their response, a detachment from
the concerns of the real world outside the joke world.  When
we are “just joking,” we claim not to truly believe the ideas we
entertain.  Such detachment superficially resembles the
appreciation some philosophers prescribe for any aesthetic
response.  In Gaut’s terms, the revelatory aspect is lost when
the lack of empathy makes the first-order prescription for
laughter impossible.
An example may help here.  The film Guess Who? (2005)
attempts an ironic twist on the classic Guess Who’s Coming to
Dinner in which a white girl brings her black fiancé home to
meet her parents.  In Guess Who? Theresa Jones, a black
woman, brings her white fiancé, Simon, to dinner at her
parents’ home to meet her family.[23]  By dinnertime her
father, Percy, who is unhappy about his daughter’s white
fiancé and determined to dislike him, has set Simon up for
failure several times already.  Over dinner, Percy continues to
manipulate Simon into revealing how unfit for Theresa he
really is.  While Percy’s motive is to encourage Simon’s
unwitting self-destruction, the insight lying behind that motive
warrants attention.
When Simon comments on his distaste for racist jokes, Percy
pounces, asking for examples of the jokes he has in mind,
expecting Simon to slide cluelessly down the inevitable
slippery slope and expose the chasm between himself and the
Joneses, and indeed all who cannot empathize with someone
whose racial identity differs from their own.  Theresa quickly
recognizes the setup and begs Simon to refuse, but he gives
in, with the best intentions.  Since he tells the jokes ironically,
Simon believes no harm can be done:
Guess Who Jokes Clip [24]
Simon’s first jokes are met with mild giggling and cause no
offense.  When Percy encourages Simon to tell more, he
obliges.  The screenwriters calculate the scene’s progression
tellingly, with each joke slightly less innocent than the one
before.  As the jokes become more provocative, they produce
bigger laughs.  Finally, Simon tells a joke that manages to
insult and hurt everyone at the table.  Clearly, Simon intended
to tell his jokes ironically; he even explicitly stated that by
telling such jokes, he believes he lessens their power.  Yet
despite his explicit intentions, the irony is doomed to failure.
The progression of jokes in the movie’s dinner scene
demonstrates the subtle distinction between harmless jokes
and hateful ones when ironic intentions fail. There is no
question of self-protective racist irony in Guess Who?  The
jokes’ racist messages are in no way valorized.  The Joneses
are not insulted because they believe that Simon agrees with
the racist message he ironically mocks. Before the dinner
scene we witnessed the particularly high value the Joneses
place on the dignity of employment. By telling the final
offensive joke, Simon has communicated a lack of respect for
the experience of workplace racial discrimination.  The
perceived insult is not rooted in a vague belief that Simon is a
racist despite his assertion to the contrary; rather, his offense
lies in his singular lack of empathy toward job discrimination.
6. Difference and indifference
Ironic racist joking requires a certain complicit objectivity on
the audience’s part.  Listeners cannot empathize with the
particular ethnicity being disparaged.  If they merely
sympathize, however, they may enjoy the joke despite their
ethical disapproval, laughing or conceding that the joke is
funny, while then expressing feelings of guilt, discomfort, or
even making a comment such as “That’s just wrong.”  Cohen
insists that our ethical disapproval not blind us to the fact that
such a joke is funny.[25]
The problem with racist and otherwise offensive jokes is
perhaps less specific than other categories of aesthetic flaw
that I have discussed.  The arts—and here I consider joke
telling a kind of art—enliven our interaction with the world. 
They teach us to see more, to see more clearly, and to see
differently.  Eaton emphasizes that the aesthetic is the
opposite of the anesthetic, that art should bring the world into
focus and make us feel more of the world, not less.[26] When
we must detach ourselves from our feelings for others in order
to laugh, the intrinsic nature of the aesthetic experience is
twisted. Invoking detachment, feeling less of the world for the
sake of laughter, numbs the heart, whereas the aesthetic
should make life more vibrant.
Aesthetic appreciation of a joke, play, or movie, etc., can
result from a performance that overcomes the artistic
shortcomings of its text . It is therefore not inconsistent to say
that the Chapelle’s Show is funny and at the same time racist
if Dave Chapelle’s skill as a performer outweighs the faults of
his material.  People sometimes resist the idea that racist
humor fails on aesthetic grounds, simply because they find it
funny.  They make the case that we can enjoy its comic
aspects by directing our attention more to the rhythm or
delivery than to the content. 
This peculiar form of humor is a kind of distorted mirror image
of tragedy in which a listener who does not condone racism
laughs at a racist joke. The nonracist listener’s pleasure
depends upon following a racist joke’s inferences to
successfully get the joke, while he enjoys something that in
principle disgusts him.  Likewise, we enjoy the sadness
resulting from our empathy with a tragic fictional character
such as Anna Karenina.  Yet when we feel heartbroken at her
death, our response is expected and appropriate.  By contrast,
the controlled attention demanded or even extorted by ironic
racist humor is made possible only by forsaking empathy, as
the listener divorces himself from the feelings of those affected
and he becomes a complicit if impartial spectator.
When I say that a joke is not good because it is racist, it does
not necessarily follow that there is nothing funny in the joke. 
What does result, however, is that appreciating such humor
entails a lack of empathy, for it insists upon numbing the
heart.[27]
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